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CRIMINAL LAW
OVERVIEW
As shown by the title headings, a variety of criminal law issues reached
the court in the last year. Among the more significant decisions were con-
structions of statutes involving food stamp crimes and trial court probation-
ary powers, a constitutional challenge to enhanced sentencing, and the
"necessity" defense in the context of political protests.
I. BLOATING FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: TAKING MONEY BY
FALSE PRETENSES AND THE FEDERAL BANK CRIMES STATUTE
Chief Judge Seth's opinion in Unitled States v. Shoels' interpreted 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b), 2 the Federal Bank Crimes Statute, to include the crime of
taking money by false pretenses. 3 This interpretation was subsequently ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Bell v. United States,4 which resolved a cir-
cuit court split over the reach of section 2113(b). The Bell decision and its
federalistic implications will be discussed following a review of the Shoels
decision and its circuit court antinomes.
A. United States v. Shoels
In Shoels, the Government alleged that the defendant presented a
$1,200 personal check for collection at a Denver savings and loan association
in July 1980. The check was made payable to Irving Butler, who testified
that although he had an account at the savings and loan association he had
never received the $1,200 check. 5 Evidence showed that the check had been
taken, possibly by Shoels, in a burglary of the home of a man who sold
Shoels an automobile earlier in the week. 6 The government contended that
Shoels' conduct violated section 2113(b); the jury agreed, finding Shoels
guilty.
7
1. 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3117 (1983).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1982) states in pertinent part:
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both ....
3. Taking money by false pretenses is defined as:
1) A false representation of material present or past fact;
2) Which causes the victim to take certain action;
3) The action taken involves transfer of title;
4) The transfer is to the wrongdoer;
5) The wrongdoer knows his representation is false; and
6) The wrongdoer intends to defraud the victim.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 655-72 (1972); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 296-319 (2d ed. 1969).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983).




Shoels argued on appeal that his actions constituted obtaining money
by false pretenses, a state crime which was not punishable under the federal
law. 8 His reasoning was that the phrase "to steal or purloin" in section
2113(b) 9 indicated Congress' intent to limit the statute to common law lar-
ceny, which did not encompass stealing by false pretenses.' 0 The Tenth Cir-
cuit disagreed and embraced a broad construction of section 2113(b), relying
on United States v. Turley, I a Supreme Court decision construing the Na-
tional Motor Vehicle Theft Act.'
2
Turley rejected the notion that the word "stolen" in the Motor Vehicle
Theft statute was confined to the definition of common law larceny.1 3 Find-
ing the word "stolen" to lack an established common law meaning,' 4 the
Court examined the statute's legislative history and purpose. Three factors
were determinative in the decision to reject the proposed limitation on the
definition of "stolen." First, there was no indication in the legislative history
of an intent to distinguish common-law larceny from other felonious tak-
ings. 15 Second, the public and private interests at stake were damaged
equally regardless of the nature of the felonious taking. '6 Third, because
federal regulation was prompted by the interstate dimensions of the crime it
was unlikely that Congress had intended to leave "loopholes for wholesale
evasion" of the law. 1
7
As noted, the Tenth Circuit cited the Turley rationale with favor.' 8 This
rationale, in conjunction with the paucity of contrary legislative history, led
the court to conclude that the words "steal or purloin" in section 2113(b)
included behavior not constituting common law larceny. 19
Relying on essentially the same rationale as Shoels, the Second, Third,
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had also adopted a broad reading of
section 2113(b). 20 Conversely, the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had
limited the application of section 2113(b) to common-law larceny. 2 1 Be-
cause an understanding of the reasons for adopting the narrower view is im-
portant for understanding the federalisic implications of the Supreme
8. Id
9. See supra note 2.
10. Id. at 381-82.
11. 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2313 (1982). The offense under this act involves interstate transpor-
tation of a motor vehicle "knowing the same to have been stolen." Id. § 2312.
13. The Supreme Court held that the term "stolen" in section 2312 included "all felonious
takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of owner-
ship, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny." 352 U.S. at 417.
14. 352 U.S. at 411.
15. Id at 414-15.
16. Id. at 416.
17. Id at 416-17.
18. 685 F.2d at 382-83. The court also stated that the term "steal" is usually given a broad
meaning under federal statutes. Id at 383.
19. Id at 383.
20. See United States v. Hinton, 703 F.2d 672 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3091 (1983);
United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1982), a~fd, 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983); United States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.),
cert. dented, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1978).
21. See United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1981); LeMasters v. United States,
378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
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Court's resolution of the circuit court conflict, the next section examines
LeMasters v. United States ,22 the most articulate exposition of the "narrower"
view.
B. LeMasters v. United States
LeMasters obtained a duplicate savings passbook for another person's
account by misrepresenting his identity, and then used this passbook to with-
draw $6,700 from the account.23 After trial, the defendant moved for ac-
quittal maintaining that while the indictment (based on section 2113(b))
charged larceny, the government had proved the crime of obtaining money
by false pretense, not larceny.24 The trial court denied the motion.25 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, placing emphasis on the legislative history and pur-
pose of section 2113(b).
26
The Ninth Circuit noted first that although an early form of the bill
which became section 2113(b) contained specific provisions for federal pun-
ishment of obtaining money by false pretenses, these provisions were deleted
by subsequent amendments. 27 Legislative history indicated that Congress
deleted the false pretenses provisions because it did not want the United
States to enter areas of state concern, such as forgery, fraud, and bad
checks.28 The Ninth Circuit invoked the statute's historical context to sup-
port this contention. Federal bank crimes legislation was needed (and in-
tended) to restrict interstate bands of "gangster bank robbers," not to protect
banks against all criminal defalcations.29 Congress intended to address a
specific problem, not to federalize crimes involving bad checks and forgeries,
crimes which did not significantly threaten interstate commerce and which
were already adequately regulated by local law enforcement authorities.
30
The Ninth Circuit court rejected the Turley analogy because the motiva-
tion underlying the Motor Vehicle Theft statute was "wholly different" from
the purpose animating section 2113(b). 3' The Motor Vehicle Theft statute
could be broadly construed because the interstate evils perceived by Con-
gress included all illegal motor vehicle sales.32 In enacting section 2113(b),
Congress was concerned only with evil of interstate bank robbers. 33 Turley's
22. 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967).
23. d at 263.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id at 263-68.
27. Id at 264-65.
28. Id at 264-66, 268.
29. Id. at 265 n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)). Although this
report accompanied a predecessor bill to section 2113(b), the court pointed to the lack of any
changed circumstances between the time the report issued and the time section 2113(b) was
enacted. At both times the salient problem was interstate bank robbery not involving stealth or
misrepresentations. 378 F.2d at 265-66.
30. Cf 378 F.2d at 268 (Congress rejected extending federal law to false pretenses because
such an extension would "serve no purpose except to confuse and dilute state responsibility for
local crimes which were being adequately dealt with by state law.").





definition of "stolen" was therefore inapposite. 34 Finally, the LeMasters
court found that the language of section 2113(b) was ambiguous, and that
ambiguities in federal criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the
accused, at least where broad construction would result in duplicating a
state offense.
35
C. Bell v. United States
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit court conflict in Bell v. United
Slates,36 by adopting a broad reading of the statute and holding that the
crime of taking by false pretenses was within the scope of section 2113(b). 37
The dissent in Bell, however, vigorously criticized the majority as ignoring
both the legislative history and LeMasters' compelling arguments for judicial
restraint in expanding federal criminal jurisdiction.38
In Bell, a check taken from the mail in Ohio was eventually deposited in
a federal savings and loan account in Miami. Bell was arrested and charged
with a violation of section 2113(b).39 Justice Powell, writing for the major-
ity, found that those who favored narrow construction of section 2113(b)
based on its text placed false reliance on the statute's "takes and carries
away" common law language. 40 Rules of statutory construction normally
require that in a federal criminal statute an undefined common law term
such as "takes and carries away" must impart its common law meaning.4'
Congress, however, did not incorporate all the elements of common-law lar-
ceny into the language of section 2113(b). Because the language used was
therefore not consistent with an intent to limit the statute solely to common
law larceny, 42 the defendant's proposed common law meaning was not in-
herently embodied in the statute.
43
Justice Powell then examined the legislative history of section 2113(b).
This section had been added as an amendment to a statute proscribing only
those bank thefts involving force or violence or the creation of fear.44 The
Court treated this history as evidencing congressional intent to protect banks
from all asset-depleting thefts, regardless of whether all the elements of com-
mon-law larceny were present. 45 Unlike the LeMasters court, the Court felt
that a change in legislative purpose had taken place during the interval be-
tween 1934, when a legislative provision directly addressing false pretenses
34. Id.
35. Id at 268 (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943)).
36. 103 S. Ct. 2398 (1983).
37. Id. at 2402.
38. Id. at 2402-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 2399.
40. Id at 2399-2400.
41. Id. at 2401 (citing 7iTrley, 352 U.S. at 411).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court extracted two textual indicia of an intent to go beyond
common-law larceny. First was the application of the statute to non-tangible property; com-
mon-law larceny was limited to personal property. Second, the statute-unlike the common
law-did not require a taking from the possession of the property's owner. Id
43. Id.




was rejected, 46 and 1937, when section 2113(b) was enacted. 47 That change
stemmed from experience with a statute which did not encompass nonvio-
lent bank crimes. 48 Reacting to that experience, Congress enacted a statute
encompassing all acts involving an illegal "taking and carrying away" of
bank assets, regardless of common-law distinctions.
49
The dissent took a contrary position, and argued forcefully for a narrow
reading that would limit the breadth of federal criminal jurisdiction. Justice
Stevens found "strong evidence of Congress' specific, limited intent" to con-
fine the statute to takings without a bank's consent. 50 Agreeing that the
purpose of the amendment including section 2113(b) was to correct omis-
sions in the original bank crimes statute, he disagreed on the scope of the
correction. The original statute did not proscribe taking without violence,
burglary, or larceny by stealth, all crimes involving taking without con-
sent.5 1 Congress' concern in amending the statute was limited to non-con-
sensual takings; there was no intent to reach all bank crimes.5 2 Justice
Stevens concluded that the legislative history of the statute precluded an
interpretation imposing federal punishment for the crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses.
53
D. Federahzstzc Implications of Shoels and Bell
Justice Stevens' dissent in Bell was motivated by a strong aversion to an
approach to federal criminal jurisdiction which would subject a person to
prosecution by both federal and state authorities for the same act. 54 In his
dissent to McElroy v. Unted StatesS5 Justice Stevens, after carefully analyzing
the legislative history of the statute in question, 56 concluded that the Court
should not unnecessarily expand federal criminal jurisdiction in order to pre-
vent the federal prosecutor from "encroach[ing] into an area of state respon-
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47. See Pub. L. No. 75-349, 50 Stat. 749 (1937).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2402.
49. Id. The Court did state that had Bell not "taken and carried away" the money he
would not have violated section 2113(b), because the statute requires an asportation. Id. at
240 1.
50. Id at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2403 & nn.3-4.
52. Id The dissent also noted that an unanimous Court had previously rejected an inter-
pretation of federal bank crime laws which would bring all "asset depleting" acts within federal
jurisdiction. Justice Stevens quoted the following passage from Jerome v. United States, 318
U.S. 101 (1943):
It is difficult to conclude in the face of this history that Congress, having rejected in
i934 an express provision making state felonies federal offenses, reversed itself in
1937. . . . It is likewise difficult to believe that Congress, through the same clause,
adopted by indirection in 1937 much of the fraud provision which it rejected in 1934.
318 U.S. at 105-06, quoted with approval tn Bell, 103 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. 103 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 2402.
55. 455 U.S. 642 (1982).
56. Mi-cElroy construed 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982), which prohibits the interstate transporta-
tion of forged securities. The Court held that the "interstate" element was satisfied if a security
was forged while in the "stream of commerce," regardless of whether the forgery took place
prior to the instrument's crossing state lines. 455 U.S. at 653-54. Justice Stevens, dissenting,
interpreted the legislative history to require forgery prior to crossing an interstate boundary. Id
at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1984]
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sibility and . . .cross[ing] a line that Congress has drawn. '5 7
The central fault with Shoels and Bell is that the opinions misread the
statutory limits evinced by section 2113(b)'s legislative history. This mis-
reading recognizes the semantic distinction between larceny and obtaining
money by false pretenses, but ignores the substantive distinction drawn by
Congress. The danger in the jurisdictionally expansive approach underlying
Shoels and Bell is the bloating of federal criminal jurisdiction, and ultimately
the "unnecessary growth of a national police force."
58
II. DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN THE
DANGEROUS SPECIAL OFFENDER STATUTE
In United States v. Sche/159 Mr. Schell made a five-prong attack on the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3575, 60 which permits a federal district court
to increase the sentence prescribed for a particular offense:6 1 To give this
increased sentence, the court must make additional factual findings, not re-
quired for conviction, that the convicted person is "dangerous" 62 and a "spe-
cial offender. '"63 Schell's challenge, although unsuccessful, raised some
57. 455 U.S. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See 103 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Other courts and commentators have
expressed concern over expanding federal criminal jurisdiction, especially where "no special
federal interest or subject matter is involved." ABRAMS, Consultant's Report onjurisdcttan, in I
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
34 (1976). See also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
59. 692 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1982).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b)-(d) (1982) provide in relevant part:
(b) If it appears by a preponderance ofthe information, including information submitted
during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing and so much of the
presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a dangerous special
offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate
term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maxi-
mum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony. Otherwise it shall sentence
the defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony.
(c) This section shall not prevent the imposition and execution of a sentence of
death or of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding twenty-five years upon any
person convicted of an offense so punishable.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the court shall not sen-
tence a dangerous special offender to less than any mandatory minimum penalty pre-
scribed by law for such felony. This section shall not be construed as creating any
mandatory minimum penalty.
(Emphasis supplied).
62. Schell was alleged to be "dangerous" according to the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f)
(1982), which provide: "A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of
confinement longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the
public from further criminal conduct by the defendant."
63. Schell was alleged to be a special offender under 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1982), which
provides:
A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if-
(1) the defendant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States, a
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or
possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof for two or more offenses committed on occasions different
from one another and from such felony and punishable in such courts by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, for one or more of such convictions the defendant
has been imprisoned prior to the commission of such felony, and less than five years
have elapsed between the commission of such felony and either the defendant's re-
lease, on parole or otherwise, from imprisonment for one such conviction or his com-
CRIMINAL LAW
compelling questions about the due process implications of the preponder-
ance evidentiary standard included in section 3575,64 the dangerous special
offender (DSO) sentencing statute.
A. The Facts
Of his own accord, James Schell took liberty from the federal correc-
tional facility at Fort Scott, Kansas.65 Unfortunately for Mr. Schell, the tal-
ons of law ensnared him and he was charged with a violation of the federal
prison escape statute.66 While awaiting trial, Schell once again took french
leave; this flight also ended in recapture, producing another escape charge.
67
The United States attorney filed the required pre-trial notice 68 stating
that the government reasonably believed that Schell was a dangerous special
offender within the terms of section 3575 and should be given an enhanced
sentence. 69 Schell pied guilty to the escape charges. 70 The judge then con-
ducted a DSO hearing to determine if the defendant's criminal behavior was
sufficiently aberrant to warrant an enhanced sentence.7 ' The trial court
found that Schell's pattern of violent criminal activity made him "danger-
ous" within the meaning of section 3575(0,72 and that Schell was a "special
offender" because the number and temporal proximity of his felony convic-
tions and jail terms satisfied the requirements of section 3575(e)(1). 73 The
trial court then used section 3575's enhanced sentencing power to sentence
Schell to two consecutive ten-year prison terms.74 The defendant appealed,
alleging that the DSO statute contained numerous constitutional deficiencies
and that his sentence was improper under the DSO standards.
B. Schell's Challenge
1. "Organized Crime" Requirement
Schell contended that Congress aimed the harsh provisions of section
3575 at organized crime figures, 75 and that because there was no proof at
mission of the last such previous offense or another offense punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under applicable laws of the United States, a State,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or possession
of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency or instru-
mentality thereof.
64. See supra note 61.
65. 692 F.2d at 673.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1982). See 692 F.2d at 673.
67. 692 F.2d at 673.
68. &e 8 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1982).
69. 692 F.2d at 673.
70. Id
71. Id at 674.
72. Id. at 675. Schell's criminal record included convictions for bank robbery, aggravated
robbery, armed robbery, and murder. Id at 674.
73. Id at 674. The Tenth Circuit explicitly limited its holding to sentences imposed pursu-
ant to the special offender definition under section 3575(e)(1). The DSO statute also permits a
person to be characterized as a special offender when that person is a professional criminal or is
part of a criminal conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(2)-(3) (1982).
74. 692 F.2d at 674.
75. Id. See generally Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 MICH. J.L. REFORM 546
(1971) (discussing legislative history of section 3575).
1984]
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trial of his involvement with organized crime the enhanced sentence under
the statute violated his due process rights. 76 The Tenth Circuit quickly dis-
missed this contention, holding that neither the legislative history of section
3575 nor its language limited its application to organized crime figures.7 7
2. Challenge to Finding of "Dangerousness"
Schell argued that because he faced sixty years in prison for other fed-
eral and state convictions he was not a threat to the public, and therefore
could not be considered "dangerous. '78 The court rejected this argument
because the DSO statute was not intended to involve the federal judiciary in
the "complexities and uncertainties of the sentencing and parole procedures
of other jurisdictions."' 79 Trial judges were therefore not required to calcu-
late the imminence of a defendant's release in applying the DSO statute.8 0
3. Eighth Amendment Does Not Bar Enhanced Sentencing
Schell also argued that because he was subject to lengthy federal and
state prison terms the additional twenty years imposed under section 3575
constituted a violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.8 1 The court dismissed this argument summarily,
finding that the eighth amendment only barred sentences "grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime."18 2 The fact that existing sentences re-
mained to be served was insignificant; absent legislative irrationality, the
state retained the power to punish lawbreakers for each transgression.
3
4. Vagueness
Next, Schell argued that the definition of "dangerous" in section 3575
was unconstitutionally vague. The Tenth Circuit joined several sister cir-
cuits in rejecting this argument.8 4 Even though Congress might have used
more precise language, congressional imprecision did not in itself render the
statute unconstitutionally vague. 85 The statute required trial judges to con-
sider the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal activity.8 6  Trial
76. 692 F.2d at 674.
77. Id See also United States v. Bailey, 537 F.2d 845, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1976),cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1051 (1977). But see United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980) (enhanced sentence permissible
under section 3575 because defendant had long-standing connection with New York organized
crime "family").




82. Id The court cited Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) for support, and speculated
that Rummel might permit any non-capital penalty for egregious felony convictions. See 692
F.2d at 675.
83. 692 F.2d at 675.
84. See United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1194
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 331-32, 335-
37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
85. 692 F.2d at 675 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975)).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(0 (1982).
[Vol. 61:2
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judges, presumably familiar with predictive processes through experience
with normal sentencing and bail proceedings, could therefore interpret the
definition of "dangerous" without having to "guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. '8 7 Because section 3575(o therefore met the minimum
standards for notice,8 8 it satisfied due process requirements. 89
5. Evidentiary Standard and Sentencing Proceedings
Finally, in the only challenge generating a dissent, 90 Schell attacked the
statute's evidentiary standards. The DSO statute permits a defendant to be
found "dangerous" and a "special offender" upon proof by a "preponder-
ance of the information." 9 1 In a split decision, Judge McKay dissenting, the
Tenth Circuit panel held that the preponderance standard satisfies a con-
victed defendant's due process rights, and rejected Schell's challenge. 92 The
majority's analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions addressing the due pro-
cess aspects of sentencing led it to conclude that the Court had not articu-
lated the evidentiary standard constitutionally required for enhanced
sentencing proceedings. 93 In Specht v. Patterson94 the Court recognized that
enhanced sentencing proceedings implicated significant due process con-
cerns, and held that a defendant subject to enhanced sentencing was entitled
to procedural protections not required when sentencing in the normal
range.95 Because Specht had not considered the evidentiary standard ques-
tion,96 however, the majority proceeded to analyze Schell's constitutional
challenge by applying the interest balancing methodology underlying mod-
87. 692 F.2d at 675. Other circuits have used similar reasoning in rejecting vagueness
attacks on section 3575(o. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has stated:
[W]e [do not] find that the term dangerous is overly broad or vague for the purposes of
sentencing. . . Factors routinely considered by a sentencing judge are the defend-
ant's past record, the probation officer's report, the nature of the present offense and
the defendant's attitude. . . . Likelihood of future criminality and the potential dan-
ger to society are determinations implicit in sentencing decisions. The concept of dan-
gerousness as defined in § 3575 is a verbalization of considerations underlying any
sentencing decision.
United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. dentd, 434 U.S. 864 (1977).
88. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975); Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926).
89. 692 F.2d at 675.
90. See id at 679 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b)'(1982). See supra note 61.
92. 672 F.2d at 679.
93. Id. at 677. The Court has held that due process requires use of the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard in proceedings leading to criminal conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970). Conversely, the Court has indicated that the preponderance standard is constitu-
tionally permissible when a court is sentencing within the range prescribed for a particular
crime. Cf Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (no significant due process concerns at
sentencing). The Tenth Circuit characterized an enhanced sentencing proceeding as a "half-
way house" between a criminal proceeding and a normal sentencing proceeding. 692 F.2d at
676. Because the enhanced sentencing power could not be invoked without making factual
findings not required for conviction, Wilhams was not controlling. Similarly, because the pro-
ceeding did not involve a separate criminal conviction, Winshzp was not controlling. Thus, the
Tenth Circuit was required to engage in an independent analysis. 692 F.2d at 676.
94. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
95. Id. at 609-10.
96. The precise issue in Specht was whether a defendant in an enhanced sentencing pro-
ceeding was entitled to an adversarial hearing at the enhanced sentencing phase of the prosecu-
tion. Id at 608.
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ern due process jurisprudence.
9 7
Interest balancing methodology requires three inquiries: 1) determin-
ing the nature of the affected private interest; 2) evaluating the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of that interest through existing procedures and the
probable value of alternate procedures in preventing such erroneous depri-
vation; and 3) assessing the nature of the governmental interest. 98 When the
calculus of these inquiries balances in favor of a private party, existing proce-
dures are constitutionally inadequate. 99
The majority recognized that defendants have a liberty interest which is
affected by an enhanced sentence, although they did not engage in a mean-
ingful analysis of the nature of this interest. moo The majority also recognized
that evidentiary standards were procedural devices for allocating the risk of
error in judicial proceedings.10 ' The "reasonable doubt" standard allocates
virtually all the risk of error to the government; the "clear and convincing"
standard allocates most of the risk to the government; the "preponderance"
standard essentially allocates the risk equally.' 0 2 The final elements injected
into the due process equation were the government's interests in protecting
society and in deterring citizens from the criminal path.'
0 3
Relying on three factors, the majority concluded that the requirements
of due process were satisfied by use of the preponderance standard. First, a
defendant in a DSO proceeding is statutorily entitled to the adversarial
hearing explicitly required by Specht.'°4 Second, given the subjective nature
of a finding of "dangerousness," the reasonable doubt standard would, as a
practical matter, lead to total subordination of the government's interests.' 0 5
Finally, Congress had openly considered the constitutional issue and decided
on the preponderance standard; that decision was entitled to great
weight. 10 6 In light of the above, the majority concluded that the parties'
interests were roughly equal, and that section 3575's preponderance stan-
dard-which divides the risk of erroneous deprivation equally between the
parties to a proceeding10 7-adequately satisfied the demands of due
process. 108
Judge McKay, in his dissent, agreed that Specht had not resolved the
97. 692 F.2d at 678 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). See also Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court's
interest-balancing approach has been criticized as giving lip service to individual due process
rights and turning a constitutional check on governmental authority into a mechanistic exercise,
Note, Specifiing the Procedures Required by Due Process.- Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975), but nonetheless remains controlling when adjudicating due
process challenges.
98. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
99. See id.
100. 692 F.2d at 678.
101. Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 676 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
103. 692 F.2d at 678. See also Addington, 441 U.S. at 429.
104. Id. at 677. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1982).
105. 692 F.2d at 679.
106. Id (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)).
107. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
108. 692 F.2d at 679.
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due process issue raised by Schell. 9 Balancing the interests involved, how-
ever, led the dissent to conclude that due process required, at a minimum,
the use of a clear and convincing standard in a DSO proceeding.110
Divergence from the majority's conclusion stemmed from Judge Mc-
Kay's careful characterization of the interests involved. Subjecting a defend-
ant to an enhanced sentencing proceeding creates the possibility that the
liberty interest not extinguished by the original proceeding can be lost.I"
This residual liberty interest, which is in freedom from confinement not pre-
scribed by a criminal conviction, is an interest of "high order."' 12 Conse-
quently, due process concerns are sharply implicated when the legislature
attempts to impose an enhanced sentence based on facts not adduced as part
of the criminal conviction; in that situation the legislature is trying to de-
prive a defendant of a portion of his liberty interest not extinguished by the
criminal conviction simpliciter.' 13 Further, the government's interests in the
DSO proceeding are not solely adversarial. The government's interests are
not limited to protecting society from the effects of dangerous criminals; the
government also has an interest in "protecting persons who are not danger-
ous from imprisonments."' 14 Both interests are of high order. 1,5
Turning to an analysis of the preponderance standard, the dissent
found two serious problems. First, although the standard would advance the
government's interest in protecting society, through causing overinclusive
application of section 3575, overinclusiveness would generate wrongful im-
prisonment, thereby "undermining the 'moral force' of the criminal law."" 16
Second, the preponderance standard's overinclusiveness would affect pri-
marily those defendants not actually falling within the statute's scope,
thereby magnifying the number of erroneous deprivations. 
117
Recognizing the proof problems of a reasonable doubt standard in the
context of a statute requiring a subjective determination,I", Judge McKay
would have required a clear and convincing standard. 1 9 This standard
would advance the government interests by eliminating overinclusiveness
109. Id. at 680 (McKay, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 684.
111. Id at 681. Judge McKay read the Supreme Court's sentencing decisions to draw a
distinction between that portion of a defendant's liberty interest extinguished by the original
conviction and the defendant's residual liberty interest. Id Cf Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493
(1980) (transfer of prisoner to mental hospital implicated due process concerns because such
transfer not within the range of confinement created by prison sentence).
112. 692 F.2d at 683 (McKay, J., dissenting). AccordIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1967).
113. 692 F.2d at 681-82 (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay limits the original depriva-
tion to that range of confinement justified solely by the criminal conviction. Any additional
confinement constituted an encroachment on a defendant's residual liberty interest. Id Judge
McKay's analysis does not bar the legislature from creating increased sentencing ranges, as the
legislatively chosen range of sentencing for the criminal conviction simpliciter defines the
residual liberty interest. Id at 681.
114. Id. at 684.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id at 683.




while simultaneously providing the defendant with sufficient protection
against erroneous deprivation of a residual liberty interest of fundamental
importance. 1
2 0
C. Analysis of Schell
Judge McKay and the majority (Judges Doyle and Logan) have sepa-
rate understandings of the necessary procedural due process safeguards to be
accorded. This results from their different assessments of the liberty interests
at stake.' 2 ' Before that conflict can be analyzed, however, it is necessary to
consider the initial premise underlying both opinions, which is that Specht
does not control the resolution of Schell's challenge.
1. Specht and Due Process at Enhanced Sentencing Proceedings
In an early decision, Williams v. New York,' 22 the Supreme Court ap-
proved of relaxed procedural rigor in the context of ordinary sentencing pro-
ceedings. Willams involved an appeal from a death sentence which had
been given based on background information in a presentence report.
23
The defense had no opportunity at trial to cross-examine the probation au-
thorities or the parties relied on in developing the fatal document. 124 The
Court upheld this procedure, distinguishing the finding of guilt from the
imposition of punishment.' 25 Adversarial protections at sentencing were
deemed unnecessary because the convicted defendant did not need the pro-
tections against caprice adversarial procedures provided for the merely in-
dicted defendant.' 26 Moreover, the sentencing judge was entitled to all
information regarding the defendant in order to make the most intelligent
imposition of sentence.127 Due process therefore did not require any proce-
dural protections, at least beyond an opportunity to object to the sentence.
The next decision addressing due process requirements at sentencing
was Spechl. Specht involved an enhanced sentencing statute 2 8 similar to sec-
tion 3575, in that both statutes required a finding of fact ("dangerousness")
not required for conviction on the underlying criminal charge. 129 The
Supreme Court held that invoking the Colorado statute involved making a
new and separate criminal charge. 130 Thus, the defendant in such a pro-
ceeding was entitled to the "full panoply" of procedural protections due pro-
cess deemed essential for a fair trial.
13 1
120. Id.
121. Compare supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text (majority opinion) with supra notes
109-117 and accompanying text (dissenting opinion).
122. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
123. Id at 244.
124. Id at 244-45.
125. Id at 246.
126. See id at 247.
127. See id at 249-51.
128. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (1963), repealed, Act of May 21, 1972, § 8, 1972,
Colo. Sess. Laws p. 268.
129. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-19-1 (1963), repealed, Act of May 21, 1972, § 8, 1972, Colo.
Sess. Laws p.2 68; 18 U.S.C. § 3575() (1982).
130. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
131. Id. at 609-10 (quoting Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
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An expansive reading of Specht would entitle those accused under sec-
tion 3575 to what the Supreme Court recognizes as one of the most funda-
mental due process protections available for criminal defendants: the
reasonable doubt standard.132 Logically, if Spech incorporates the "full pan-
oply" of due process protections, the preponderance of the evidence standard
in the DSO statute is patently unconstitutional. Specht, however, for several
reasons, has not been read so broadly.
First, Specht predates the cases establishing the due process balancing
test, making it inappropriate to extend Specht without engaging in balancing
analysis. 133 Additionally, while Specht explicitly required some procedural
due process protections, the beyond the reasonable doubt standard was not
mentioned. 134 Further, the fact that additional factfinding is required in an
enhanced sentencing proceeding does not seem determinative, in light of the
fact that Williams (which was explicitly reaffirmed in Specht)' 35 permits a
judge to engage in additional factfinding.' 36 Finally, the Court has recog-
nized the due process fundamentality of the reasonable doubt standard in
the context of a defendant's conviction proceeding, not in the context of a
post-conviction proceeding. 137 Although the foregoing clearly does not settle
the question, until the Supreme Court actually decides the issue it appears
that both the majority and the dissent properly rejected Specht and WZlhiams
as controlling precedent.1
38
2. Weighing the Interests
It is apparent that the defendant in a DSO proceeding has a substantial
liberty interest: his residual freedom.' 39 In evaluating the degree of proof
required, it is important to remember Justice Brennan's statement that
"[t]he procedure by which the facts of the case are determined assume an
importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule to be applied.
And the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the
132. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1967).
133. Cf 692 F.2d at 680 (McKay, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court has developed "more disci-
plined method of due process analysis" since Specht).
134. Specht required a hearing, assistance of counsel, compulsory process, cross-examination
of adverse witnesses, written findings of fact, and appeal from an adverse decision. 386 U.S. at
610. These protections are all included in a DSO proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1982).
It should be noted, however, that the evidentiary standard question was not before the Court in
Specht. See supra note 96.
135. Specht, 386 U.S. at 608.
136. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Stauaes P iemting k-cre.-sed &'.s for Habitual Or
Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1975).
137. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1967). Winship's concern with due process at the
original conviction stage of the criminal justice process is demonstrated by its citation to that
portion of/n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that due process rights are invoked in a
proceeding leading to confinement. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at
50-51). Winsh'p did not cite Specht, perhaps indicating that the Court perceives a distinction
between post-conviction and pre-conviction proceedings. Additionally, note that Wl jiams drew
the pre-/post-conviction distinction. 337 U.S. at 246.
138. Cf Note, supra note 136, at 373 (precise answers to due process requirements at en-
hanced sentencing proceedings not deducible from Court's decisions "as a matter of pure
logic").
139. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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procedural safeguards surrounding those rights."' 140
The selection of a burden of proof depends on the societal interests
which are pitted in certain types of litigation. For instance, the preponder-
ance standard (more probable than not) is used in civil cases, where the law
considers plaintiffs and defendants equal, and considers the possibility of an
erroneous verdict without grave consequences. 14' When moral issues are in-
volved in a civil proceeding, such as libel, the Court requires a standard
which is stricter than the preponderance standard-clear and convincing
evidence. 142 In deportation, denaturalization, and expatriation cases, where
fundamental interests are at stake, the more exacting, clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence standard is also utilized. 143 Thus, the clear and con-
vincing standard generally applies in situations where "[t]he various interests
of society are pitted against restrictions on the liberty of the individual."'
144
Finally, in criminal proceedings, which involve immense interests, the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard is required.
145
From this recitation, it is obvious that the defendant's residual freedoms
can be classified as significant, throwing doubt on the propriety of section
3575's preponderance standard. It would be virtually impossible to prove an
individual "dangerous" beyond a reasonable doubt, however. The most rea-
sonable solution to the dilemma was articulated by Judge Friendly in Holi's
v. Smith.1
4 6
Hol/s involved an enhanced sentencing proceeding not unlike that in
Specht. Following a cursory psychiatric examination the judge found Hollis
dangerous to society and sentenced him to an indeterminate'term. 14 7 The
appellate court recognized that a finding of "dangerousness" based on psy-
chiatric evidence is both onerous and uncertain; given Hollis' significant lib-
erty interest, the judge should have used a "clear, unequivocal and
convincing" standard. 148 The dissent in Schell cites Holis and, echoing Hol-
h's' concern for a defendant's liberty interest, found the clear and convincing
evidence standard necessary in DSO proceedings.' 49 Given the defendant's
fundamental interest, and the fact that the preponderance standard's overin-
clusiveness causes the risk of erroneous deprivation to fall most significantly
on the "non-dangerous" defendant, the dissent's position more properly rec-
ognizes the due process protections required by the DSO proceeding.
140. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
141. Set supra notes 10 1-03 and accompanying text.
142. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 333-32 (1974) (libel requires proof by clear and convincing standard); 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2498, p. 329 (3d. ed. 1940) (fraud and undue influence should be
proven by clear and convincing amount of evidence).
143. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665 (1944).
144. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
145. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
146. 571 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1978).
147. Id. at 688-89.
148. Id at 695-96.
149. 692 F.2d at 684-85 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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III. THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT FOR FOOD STAMP FRAUD
In United States v. O'Brien 150 the Tenth Circuit, in a case of first impres-
sion, 15 1 set forth the elements necessary for conviction under 7 U.S.C.
§ 2024(b), 15 2 the criminal fraud provision of the Food Stamp Act.' 53 Sec-
tion 2024(b) provides that "whoever knowingly . . . acquires [food stamp]
coupons" in any unauthorized manner has committed a felony. 5 4 The issue
on appeal was whether this section required proof that the defendant knew
that the manner of acquisition was not authorized by the Food Stamp
Act. 155 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the defendants' contention that to
support a conviction, the trial court must instruct the jury that the defend-
ant knew the manner in which the food stamps were acquired was not au-
thorized by the statute.
156
A. The Facts
Bonnie Sue O'Brien was contacted by a friend who asked Mrs. O'Brien
if she wanted to purchase some food stamps. 157 Unknown to Mrs. O'Brien,
her friend (Clark) was acting as an informant.' 5 8 Mrs. O'Brien eventually
gave Clark and her companion (an undercover agent) $220 in exchange for
$500 of food coupons. 159 This conduct resulted in the first charge against
Bonnie O'Brien.'6o
Several weeks later, Clark and the undercover agent contacted Paul
O'Brien (Bonnie's husband) and asked whether he would exchange twenty
tablets of phenmetrazine for $500 in food stamps. 16 1 O'Brien agreed; after
obtaining the drugs, the proposed transaction was made. 162 Although the
undercover agent stated that Bonnie O'Brien actually effectuated the ex-
change, charges were brought against both O'Briens.'
6 3
At the trial the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count, and the
judge declared a mistrial. ' 64 The same jury, however, returned with a guilty
verdict against Mr. and Mrs. O'Brien on the second count. 165 As noted
above, the O'Briens then appealed the adequacy of the jury instructions.
150. 686 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1982).
151. Id at 852.
152. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1982). This section reads in relevant part: "[W]hoever knowingly
... acquires [food stamp] coupons . . . in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the
regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such coupons . . . are of a value of $100 or
more, be guilty of a felony ... " Id § 2024(b)(1).
153. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1982).
154. See supra note 152.
155. 686 F.2d at 852. The appeal arose from the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that
an element of the crime was knowledge of the unauthorized manner of acquisition. Id
156. Id.
157. Id at 851.
158. Id
159. Id









The Tenth Circuit examined the language of the statute and found that
it was ambiguous because the adverb "knowingly" could be read to modify
either the word "acquire" or the phrase "acquire in a manner not author-
ized."' 16 6 Judge McWilliams, who wrote the opinion, first examined the leg-
islative history of section 2024(b) and found it unhelpful because the issue of
knowledge of unauthorized acquisition was never discussed. 16 7 Similarly,
earlier versions of the Food Stamp Act did not prove to be of assistance in
clarifying the statute.168 Lacking helpful legislative history, the Tenth Cir-
cuit applied the maxim of statutory construction that criminal statutes
should be construed against the government and in favor of the accused. 1
69
Additionally, because the offense involved a felony, the court read the stat-
ute as requiring criminal intent. 1
70
Utilizing these rules, the panel held that reversible error was committed
when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that knowledge that the man-
ner of acquisition was in violation of statute or regulation constituted an
essential element of the crime.' 71 The significance of the O'Brien decision is
that it is the first reported decision to delineate the mens rea element of
section 2024(b).
IV. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE AND POLITICAL PROTEST: ROCKY FLATS
SIT-IN CASE
In United States v. Seward,' 72 the court considered the requisite showing
of justification necessary to sustain the defense of "necessity" or "choice of
evils" in the political protest context.
A. The Facts
Several thousand people were permitted to use an isolated ten-acre por-
tion of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant site in Jefferson County, Colorado on
April 28, 1979 for a peaceful and orderly demonstration during which no
arrests occurred. 173 On the next day, three groups of protestors returned; 283
members of these groups were arrested when they crossed a painted line at
the east access gate of the plant, which indicated the area of restricted access
to the government property. 174 The protesters were symbolically resisting
166. Id at 851-52 & n.3. See also W. LA FAVE & A. Sco-r, supra note 3, at § 27 (discussing,
in an analogous situation under "blue sky" laws, problem of determining which clauses were
modified by adverb "knowingly").
167. 686 F.2d at 852.
168. Id at 852-53.
169. Id at 853. This is a markedly different approach than that taken by the Tenth Circuit
in construing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1982), the Federal Bank Crimes statute. See supra notes 1-19
and accompanying text.
170. 686 F.2d at 853.
171. Id. at 853-54.
172. 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. deniedsub nom. Ahrendt v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
789 (1983).
173. Id. at 1271-72.
174. Id. at 1272. The defendants were charged with trespass on an installation of the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (1976) and 10 C.F.R. §§ 860.1-
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the presence of the plant, which they considered a threat to community
health and well-being because of the nuclear research and development ac-
tivities performed there.175
Following arraignment on trespass charges, the prosecution filed a mo-
tion in limine seeking to prevent the defendants from presenting evidence at
trial supporting common-law "necessity" defenses including justification,
self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property.176 At the hearing on
this motion the trial court ordered the defense to submit written offers of
proof substantiating the common law defenses sought to be excluded by the
prosecution. 177 Numerous offers were presented, the defendants proffering
expert testimony on the effects of radiation, the risk of leaking radioactive
material, the existing levels of soil contamination around the Rocky Flats
Plant, and the lack of viable relief through the political system.'17
On June 7, 1979, all of the trial judges assigned to the cases 179 joined in
an order placing strict requirements on the use of the common-law necessity
defenses. The trial judges' order stated that to use the necessity defenses, the
defendant had to make an acceptable offer of proof at trial. '8 0 The offer had
to show: 1) a direct causal relationship between the defendant's actions and
the cessation of the harmful activity; 2) the defendants were preventing
criminal conduct by the government; 3) the government's criminal act was
occurring in the defendants presence; and 4) no alternative short of criminal
activity was available to halt the objectionable activity at Rocky Flats.'"'
Although made in accordance with this order, the offers of proof were uni-
formly denied.18 2 On appeal, the defendants challenged this action.'
8 3
B. The Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts' assault on
the necessity defenses, finding that several essential elements were not satis-
fied by the offers of proof.' 84 The court defined the elements of the defense
as 1) the absence of a legal alternative to criminal conduct; 2) imminence of
harm, and 3) proof of a causal relationship between the criminal conduct
.8 (1983). 687 F.2d at 1271. For a discussion of an administrative law challenge to the trespass
convictions, see Admnistratwe Law, Tenth Annual Tenth Czrcuit Survey, 61 DEN. L.J. 109, 110-17
(1984).
175. 687 F.2d at 1274, 1276.
176. Id at 1273. It is not clear whether all the defenses were properly termed "necessity";
the defenses of necessity are similar to duress defenses but conceptually distinct. See W. LAFAVE
& A. ScoT-r, supra note 3. at § 50. at 383.
177. 687 F.2d at 1273.
178. Id
179. The defendants were divided into several groups of 15 to 20 for trial; on appeal, the
appellants were similarly grouped. Id. at 1272.
180. Id. at 1273.
181. Id at 1273-74. The trial court supported its order by citing United States v. The Di-
ana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354 (1869); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
182. 687 F.2d at 1274.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1275.
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and avoidance of the imminent harm.' 8 5 The appellate court saw the avail-
ability of another, legal course of action-political action-as the primary
impediment to the necessity defenses. 186 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
the necessity defense is based on a real emergency confronting an individual
who then has no choice but to perform a criminal act.1 8 7 In the Seward case
this "indispensable element" was absent. t 88 Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defense.
C. The "Necessity" Defense and Poltical Protests
The application of the necessity defense involves an examination of the
utility of the two acts confronting the defendant: the criminal act is weighed
against the harm avoided.' 89 In the eyes of the Seward defendants, the nega-
tive effects of criminal trespass were weighed against the effect of radioactive
materials on the persons and environment near the plant. Given this bal-
ance, the Seward defendants felt impelled to break the law. The cases and
commentators, however, stress that the availability of a third course of action
will preclude the defense when that third course of action provides an effec-
tive means of preventing the criminal harm without the necessity of law-
breaking. The Seward court assumed that an effective course of action was
available in the political mechanism. Of course, this reflects a judgment on
the severity and immediacy of the harm to persons and the environment
which might result while the defendants pursue a political course of action.
It is probably more appropriate for the court to look to the element of causa-
tion as justification for precluding the defense: the defendants' trespass on a
small corner of the property did not significantly alter the course of plant
operation. This more objective criterion is preferable because courts deal
with causation on a daily basis. The effect of nuclear research on persons
and the environment is far more speculative.
V. ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE: ADMISSION OF CRIME CHARGED REMAINS
A PREREQUISITE
In United States v. Pride,190 the defendant Pride was convicted on all
three counts of the indictment: count one, unlawfully transporting a female
from New Mexico to Texas for the purpose of prostitution; 191 count two,
185. Id at 1275 (citing State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973)).
186. 687 F.2d at 1275. The offers of proof had attempted to show the futility of resort to the
political process; the Tenth Circuit found those offers insufficient. "The references to attempted
political action were inadequate and only referred to attempts by other persons." Id. (emphasis
supplied).
187. Id at 1276.
188. Id
189. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 3, at § 50.
190. No. 80-1909 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1982).
191. Id. at 2. Pride was charged with violating the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982),
which provides in part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of
Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, any woman or girl for
the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with
the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a
prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral
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unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute;' 92 and count
three, unlawful distribution of cocaine to Robin Phillips. 193 The evidence
showed that Pride had transported Robin Phillips, along with other prosti-
tutes, from New Mexico to Texas for the purpose of having the women en-
gage in prostitution. After returning to New Mexico, Phillips reported
Pride's activities to the Albuquerque Police Department and agreed to act as
an informant. 19 4  Subsequently, Phillips and Pride had a meeting where
they used cocaine. At the trial the testimonies of Phillips and Pride con-
flicted as to who provided the cocaine, each claiming the other had fur-
nished the controlled substance.195 Nonetheless, Pride took the fall.
On appeal, Pride contended that his convictions on the drug charges
should be reversed because the district court failed to give an instruction on
entrapment.' 96 Generally, entrapment is available as a defense only when
the defendant admits commission of the crime.' 97 Pride apparently at-
tempted to persuade the court that his admission that he had used or pos-
sessed cocaine provided by Ms. Phillips was sufficient to fulfill this
requirement. 198 He further asserted that it would be "wholly inconsistent
with his testimony and generally absurd" for the defendant to be required to
admit to the crimes as charged in light of his theory of defense. 199
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge McWilliams, first noted that although
several courts have departed from the general rule and permitted an accused
to rely upon a defense of entrapment while denying commission of the acts
constituting the charged offenses,2°° a "vast majority" of courts hold that the
accused may not assert entrapment without also admitting the offense as
charged.20 ' Citing Untted States v. Freeman,202 a Tenth Circuit case holding
practice... [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
192. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 2. This charge related to violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1982) which provides in part: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or pos-
sess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... "
193. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 2. This count also charged a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1982).
194. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 3. Phillips was given a tape recorder for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence. Pride could not prove he was prejudiced by the quality of the tape recording
or the government's delay in delivering a copy of the tape to his attorney. The Tenth Circuit
therefore found no abuse of discretion in admitting the tape. Id at 5-7.
195. Id
196. "Entrapment occurs when the criminal design originates with agents of the govern-
ment who implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense."
United States v. Gusule, 522 F.2d 20, 23 (10th Cir. 1975),cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976). Pride
did not appeal his conviction under the Mann Act.
197. See, e.g., Padilla v. United States, 421 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1970).
198. See No. 80-1909, slip op. at 3.
199. Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, United States v. Pride, No. 80-1909 (10th Cir. Aug. 3,
1982).
200. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 4 n.3 (citing United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182 (5th
Cir. 1977),cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir.
1975); Hansford v. United States, 262 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1958) (per curiam)).
201. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 4 n.3 (citing United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Arnese, 631 F.2d 1041, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Brooks,
611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 964 (3d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d 411,418 (7th Cir. 1977)). Among Tenth Circuit cases holding
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that the defense of entrapment was inconsistent with denial of transacting a
drug sale with government agents, the court refused to depart from the ma-
jority view. 20 3 Pride therefore reaffirms that in the Tenth Circuit the defense
of entrapment is not available to a defendant denying commission of the
crime charged. In reaffirming its previous rule, the court eschewed comment
upon the obfuscation and highly prejudicial effect a defendant's admission
to the crimes charged might have upon juror consideration of the defend-
ant's alternate theories of defense.
VI. DISTRICT COURT PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY IN PROBATION
PROCEEDINGS
Herzfeld v. United States District Court20 4 was an appeal arising from the
aftermath of the mail fraud conviction of Trenton H. Parker in connection
with numerous fraudulent tax shelter investment schemes. Mr. Parker pled
guilty to mail fraud under a plea agreement which required him to transfer
approximately six million dollars, previously in a Bahamian bank, to the
registry of the trial court. 205 This money was generated by Parker's "Gold
Tax Shelter Investment Program" (Gold Program), which was the fraudu-
lent investment program leading to Parker's mail fraud conviction. 20 6 The
district court ordered this money paid as restitution, and appointed a re-
ceiver to administer the fund.207 Two separate groups of plaintiffs maintain-
ing civil fraud actions against Parker based on the Gold Program then
brought suit seeking to have the receivership dissolved.208 The United
States District Court for the District of Colorado refused to invalidate the
receivership and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292,209 certified to the Tenth Cir-
cuit the question of whether a federal district court has the power, in a crimi-
nal proceeding, to create a receivership to effect restitution.
210
On appeal, the civil plaintiffs argued that in the absence of express au-
thority the district court had no jurisdiction to create the receivership. 2i No
specific statutory provisions prohibiting the creation of a receivership in a
matter of criminal restitution were tendered to the court. 2t 2
The Tenth Circuit held that implicit in both a district court's statutory
authority to order restitution as a condition of probation2i 3 and the latitude
the same are United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 650, 652-53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980) and Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243, 244 (10th Cir. 1970).
202. 412 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1969).
203. No. 80-1909, slip op. at 4-5.
204. 699 F.2d 503 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 70 (1983).
205. Id at 504.
206. Id.
207. Id
208. Id. The two groups included a group of Colorado plaintiffs with a judgment against
Parker and a group of New Jersey plaintiffs maintaining a class action against Parker. Id
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982). This section permits a district court to certify an interlocu-
tory appeal to an appellate court. Id. § 1292(b).
210. 699 F.2d at 505.
211. Id
212. See id.
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), which provides in pertinent part: "While on probation
and among the conditions thereof, the defendant- . . may be required to make restitution or
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provided by Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b) 2 14 was the authority to take those actions
necessary 21 5 or appropriate 21 6 to effect restitution. In reaching this conclu-
sion the court relied upon two distinct analyses. The first was grounded in
the premise that any legislative grant of judicial power "carries with it the
right to use the means and instrumentalities necessary to the beneficial exer-
cise of that power."'2 17 Because a receivership might be necessary to effect
restitution to numerous unknown victims, the district court's action was not
inherently void.21 ' The Tenth Circuit's decision did not rest on that narrow
ground, however. The court noted that Congress had never detailed the
manner in which restitution could be effected, but had nonetheless granted
restitutionary power.2 19 Congress' legislative intent in permitting restitution
must necessarily have been to create sufficient flexibility and authority to
utilize practical means useful in accomplishing restitution. 220 Where large
sums of money are involved, the "practical needs" of the system justify crea-
tion of a receivership. 2 2 ' The Tenth Circuit carefully limited its holding,
however, by stating that because the receiver was under the control and di-
rection of the district court there could be no suggestion that the establish-
ment of the receivership constituted an unlawful delegation of authority to
private parties.
222
Finally, the court rejected the civil plaintiffs' contentions that they were
equitably entitled to the fund because of their diligence in bringing Parker
to justice and discovering the fund.22 3 The receivership and restitution were
an integral part of Parker's plea bargain arrangement. 224 The concern on
appeal was the validity of the manner chosen to effect that arrangement, not
equitable entitlement to the fund. 225 Accordingly, the lower court's power
to create the receivership was affirmed.
226
reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which con-
viction was had ... "
214. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) provides: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule,
the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any
applicable statute."
215. 699 F.2d at 505.
216. Id. at 506.
217. Id at 505 (citing Blue Cross Ass'n v. Harris, 622 F.2d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 1980)). See also
Daly v. Stratton, 326 F.2d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1964).
218. See 699 F.2d at 505.
219. Id
220. Id at 506.
221. Id. The court supported its conclusion by noting that unique probation orders entered
under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) have been upheld by circuit courts. Id (citing United States v.
Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.), cerl.
dentied, 435 U.S. 923 (1977); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975)).
222. 699 F.2d at 506.
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VII. LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CREATIVE SENTENCING AND
SYMBOLIC RESTITUTION
A. Limiting "Creative Sentencing" United States v. Prescon Corp.
In United States v. Prescon Corp. 227 the defendants Prescon Corporation
(Prescon) and VSL Corporation (VSL) pled nolo contendere to charges of
bid rigging to eliminate competition on commercial construction projects in
Colorado and nine neighboring states,228 and mail fraud in connection with
the submission of the rigged bids.2 29 The trial court sentenced Prescon and
VSL to unsupervised probation and fined the defendants $252,000 and
$302,000, respectively. 2 30 The sentence provided, however, that the execu-
tion of these fines would be suspended if the corporate defendants deposited,
respectively, the sums of $50,000 and $75,000 "into the registry of the Court,
to be disbursed to such community agencies as selected by the Chief Proba-
tion Officer with the approval of the Court. ' ' 231 The district court expressed
its hope that the funds would be used for community programs aimed at
decreasing crimes, but did not specifically require the funds be used for that
purpose.
2 32
The government, claiming the sentence to be illegal, appealed on the
grounds that the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651,233 did not authorize a
sentence permitting a corporation, as an alternative to paying a fine, to
make contributions to persons or groups not aggrieved by the crime.2 34 In
the alternative, the government requested a writ of mandamus be issued to
the district court. 235 The defendants vigorously objected, contending that
the government had no right of appeal absent explicit statutory authority,
and that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy.2 36 The Tenth Circuit
held that the United States had the right to appeal an assertedly illegal sen-
tence under both the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3731,237 the Criminal Ap-
227. 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
228. Defendants were charged with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982). 695 F.2d at 1238.
229. Defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). 695 F.2d at 1238.
230. 695 F.2d at 1238.
231. Id
232. Id at 1238-39.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction . . . any court having jurisdiction to try
offenses against the United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-... May
be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages
or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had . ...
Id
234. 695 F.2d at 1240.
235. Id
236. Id
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982), which provides:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or informa-
tion as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
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peals Act, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,238 which permits an appeal of a final
decision.
239
After analyzing decisions from the Supreme Court and various circuit
courts, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, notwithstanding the limiting lan-
guage of section 3731,240 this statute removed all statutory barriers to crimi-
nal appeals. 24 ' As a result, only constitutional constraints, such as the
double jeopardy clause, 24 2 could preclude government appeals in criminal
cases. 243 Because the government's appeal was limited to the trial court's
proposed modification of the original sentences, double jeopardy concerns
did not bar this appeal. 244 Appellate jurisdiction was also sustained by hold-
ing that the trial court's sentences were final decisions within the meaning of
section 129 1.245 Because of its assumption of jurisdiction and decision on the
merits, the Tenth Circuit did not examine the propriety of mandamus in this
case.
246
In determining the legality of the terms of the sentence imposed by the
district court, the Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, adhered to the narrow
interpretation of the Probation Act the Tenth Circuit first embraced in
United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Associalion.247 In Clovis, the
defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere to charges of violating the Sher-
man Antitrust Act 248 through conspiring to fix retail liquor prices. As a
condition of probation, the trial court had directed defendants to pay
$233,500 to a private group which coordinated alcoholism treatment pro-
grams. 249 The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's sentence because it
could not conclude that the recipient of the fund, or the persons it helped or
represented, were aggrieved parties within the meaning of section 3651.25°
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Prescon could not conclude that the alter-
native payment option imposed by the district court conformed to any of the
special conditions of probation permitted by section 3651.25 1 The court
noted that the enumeration of the four specific conditions of probation did
not "close the door" to other conditions, and reaffirmed its holding in Porth v.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), which provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
239. 695 F.2d at 1240.
240. The plain language of section 3731 seems to limit its scope to court orders dismissing
criminal charges. See supra note 237.
241. 695 F.2d at 1241.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
243. 695 F.2d at 1241.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id at 1240.
247. 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976).
248. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
249. 540 F.2d at 1390.
250. Id See supra note 233.
251. The Tenth Circuit reads section 3651 to permit, in addition to a fine, four special
conditions of parole: "restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties, provision for support of a
person for whom a defendant is legally responsible, participation in a residential community
treatment center, and participation in a community program for drug addicts." 695 F.2d at
1242. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
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Templar 252 that the conditions of parole must have "a reasonable relation-
ship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.
253
Nonetheless, the court held that the language of section 3651, which specifi-
cally permitted an order of restitution to aggrieved parties for actual injury
or damages, precluded a trial court from ordering a defendant to make pay-
ments to parties who were not victims of the defendant's criminal con-
duct. 2 5 4  Clearly the nexus between the "aggrieved parties" and the
alternative payments in Prescon was even less discernible than that in Clovis,
where the dealers in alcoholic beverages were ordered to make payments to
groups concerned with treating alcoholism. The Tenth Circuit therefore re-
versed the trial court's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.
255
B. "Creative Sentencing" A Survey
Although the Tenth Circuit Court, absent any dissent, has adhered to a
strictly limited and unequivocal interpretation of a court's power under sec-
tion 3651, it should not be surmised that this approach represents the only
reasonable reading of the statute. Several courts have explicitly rejected the
reasoning used by the Tenth Circuit and have allowed a more liberal or
"progressive" construction of section 3651, in promotion of the concepts of
creative sentencing and behavioral sanctions.2 56  These courts have not
found the enumerated conditions of probation to be exclusive, nor have they
been convinced that the maxim expressio unis exclusio alterius governs, 25 7 as
is the Tenth Circuit.
258
Perhaps most notable of the cases validating creative sentencing is the
Eighth Circuit decision United States v. Wilam Anderson Co. 259 Anderson, like
Prescon, was a construction bid rigging and mail fraud case. 26 0 The corpo-
rate defendants in Anderson were placed on probation with special conditions,
252. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
253. Id at 333. Accord United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982).
254. 695 F.2d at 1243.
255. Id at 1245.
256. "Creative sentencing" and "behavioral sanctions" are terms used to describe a sentenc-
ing approach which seeks to provide an alternative to fines or incarceration where those sanc-
tions appear inappropriate. This approach is often used with corporations whose monetary
resources eliminate the punitive effect of a fine, e.g. United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677
F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982), and with defendants otherwise entitled to probation but for whom
additional behavioral sanctions are needed. E.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.
1979) (former state representative convicted for violating federal election laws required to re-
frain from political candidacy because of representative's demonstrated propensity to abuse
electoral process). See also United States v. William Anderson Co., 686 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982)
(fine suspended upon payment to charity); United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1979)
(probation required employment with charity); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F.
Supp. 213 (D. Md. 1983) (requiring payment to charity); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co.,
563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring donation of bread to charity; distinguishing Pres-
con as involving monetary payment).
257. See 695 F.2d at 1245.
258. The Tenth Circuit stated in Prescon that a more specific provision (grant of restitution-
ary power towards victim) governed over a more general provision (grant of power to order
probation on terms court considers best). 695 F.2d at 1243.
259. 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982).
260. Id at 911.
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including installment payment of fines to charitable organizations.2 6 1 If the
corporate defendant elected to pay the fine to the charitable organization for
which its officers or employees were performing community service work in
fulfillment of their individual sentences, then the amount payable to the
Government was reduced pro tanto.2 62 Judge Urbom of the United States
District Court for the District of Nebraska, who imposed the sentences,
opined that "a sentence should be constructive, if possible. ' ' 26 3
The Eighth Circuit upheld Anderson on the principle that the purpose of
section 3651 is to give judges broad discretion in fashioning sentences, and
that unique probationary conditions are enumerated in section 3651264 to
place their propriety beyond doubt rather than to limit a court's discre-
tion.265 Several courts have reached similar conclusions, stating "[i]t would
be hard to use more general words than 'upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems best.' ",266 These courts have recognized that the broad dis-
cretion under section 3651 permits reversal only for abuse of that discre-
tion,267 and refuse to eliminate the discretion to impose sentences tailored to
meet the circumstances of a particular case.
2 6 8
Creative sentences, such as those imposed in Anderson, are intended to
effect general rehabilitation and specific deterrence against the offense com-
mitted.2 69 Such sentences alert corporate decisionmakers to the dangers of
violating criminal law, thereby deterring corporate criminality. 270 Courts
which impose and review these sentences view the restitution not as "actual
restitution" but as "symbolic restitution," designed primarily to deter future
misconduct on the part of defendants and reform the principles of their in-
dustry rather than provide compensation to victims.2 7' Under such a view,
"symbolic restitution" can be distinguished from the "restitution" language
of section 3651, and escape even the strict construction of the Act adhered to
by the Tenth Circuit. Accordingly, probationary conditions need not be




261. Id at 912.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra note 233.
265. 698 F.2d at 914. The Eighth Circuit explicitly noted that its decision was limited to
the scope of a court's probationary (as opposed to sentencing) powers. Id
266. E.g., Daniow Pastr Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1169 (quoting United States v. Pastore, 537
F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1976)).
267. E.g., Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1982). See also United States v.
Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1976).
268. See supra note 256.
269. See Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Agathst Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 970, 977.
270. Anderson, 698 F.2d at 913-14; Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1167; See Note, Struc-
tural Crime and Instiutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 Yale L.J. 353,
370-71 (1979).
271. See, e.g., Arthur, 602 F.2d at 664; Danlow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. at 1169.
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